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ABSTRACT
Appendix A provides ﬁrm-level and industry-level evidence that is consistent with several
key features of our model, including the predictions that rates of return increase with
a ﬁrm’s intangible investments and foreign aﬃliate rates of return increase with age and
with their parents’ R&D intensity. Appendix B provides details for the computation of our
model’s equilibrium paths, the construction of model national and international accounts,
and the sensitivity of our main ﬁndings to alternative parameterizations of the model. We
demonstrate that the main ﬁnding of our paper—namely, that the mismeasurement of
capital accounts for roughly 60 percent of the gap in FDI returns—is robust to alternative
choices of income shares, depreciation rates, and tax rates, assuming the same procedure is
followed in setting exogenous parameters governing the model’s current account. Appendix
C demonstrates that adding technology capital and locations to an otherwise standard two-
country general equilibrium model has a large impact on the predicted behavior of labor
productivity and net exports.
∗The paper, data, and codes are available at our website http://www.minneapolisfed.org/
research/sr/sr406.html. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not nec-
essarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Table of Contents
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iiAppendix A.
Firm- and Industry-Level Evidence on Rates of Return
Our theory predicts three patterns involving accounting rates of return:
1. Accounting rates of return increase with R&D and advertising intensities;
2. Accounting rates of return of foreign aﬃliates increase with parents’ R&D intensity;
3. Accounting rates of return of foreign aﬃliates increase with age.
In this appendix, we present strong microeconomic evidence supporting these predictions.1
A.1. Rates of Return Increase with Intangible Expenditures
In this section, we provide ﬁrm-level and industry-level evidence that accounting rates of
return increase with expenditures on R&D and advertising. This is of interest because
our theory predicts that accounting proﬁts are higher than true proﬁts if ﬁrms invest in
intangible assets. Because these investments are expensed, measured income includes a
return on past intangible capital investments, but measured capital excludes the R&D
capital and brand equity. This implies that measured rates of return should increase with
R&D and advertising stocks.
Early studies focused on advertising only. Ali Shah and Akbar (2008) survey the
literature relating advertising intensity and proﬁtability back to the 1960s. An important
early paper by Comanor and Wilson (1967) found a signiﬁcantly positive relation across
ﬁrms between rates of return and advertising intensities for 41 consumer goods industries.
The authors attributed this relation to the existence of market power and concluded that
1 All rates of return discussed in this appendix are based on accounting data of U.S. corporations.
Adjustments have not been made to convert book values to market values or historical costs to
current costs. This is typically done by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) once ﬁrm-level data
have been aggregated.
1advertising played a critical role in creating barriers to entry.2 Comanor and Wilson (1967)
followed standard accounting practice and treated advertising as an expense rather than
an investment; they did not correct proﬁt rates by capitalizing advertising expenditures.
Correcting proﬁt rates to appropriately count advertising as an investment led Bloch
(1974), Ayanian (1975), and Demsetz (1979) to the opposite conclusion: the strong positive
relationship between proﬁt rates and advertising is due to expensing not to market power.
Bloch (1974) analyzed 40 ﬁrms over the period 1950–1953 with data from Printer’s Ink.
Ayanian (1975) analyzed 39 ﬁrms over the period 1959–1968 with data from Advertising
Age. In a follow-up study, Demsetz (1979) noted that “to demonstrate that an accounting
artifact is at work is not suﬃcient to demonstrate an absence of barriers to entry.” He
addressed the issues separately using IRS data for the period 1958–1967 and found that
(1) the correlation between advertising intensity and proﬁt rates was due to accounting
practices, and (2) advertising did not create a barrier to entry.
Grabowski and Mueller (1978) reconsider the question of why rates of return are
increasing with intangible investments by including both R&D and advertising before
adjusting rates of return. They used a sample of 86 ﬁrms primarily in producer goods
industries over the period 1959–1966. In Figure A.1, we display the diﬀerence in the
average rates of return by industry: the rate of return when intangibles are expensed
less the rate of return when intangibles are capitalized. The 86 ﬁrms were grouped into
nine industry categories. There are two miscellaneous categories, denoted progressive and
nonprogressive. The classiﬁcation of progressive and nonprogressive depends on whether
a ﬁrm’s R&D capital to total capital was above or below 10 percent.
As Figure A.1 indicates, capitalizing intangible investments implies a large adjustment
2 See also the Federal Trade Commission (1972) complaint against the four largest U.S. manufacturers
of ready-to-eat cereals. The FTC charged that “these practices of proliferating brands, diﬀerentiating
similar products and promoting trademarks through intensive advertising result in high barriers to
entry in the RTE cereal market. . . . Respondents have obtained proﬁts and returns substantially
in excess of those that they would have obtained in a competitively structured market.”
2Figure A.1. Rate of Return if R&D and Advertising are Capitalized
Less Rate if Expensed, by Size of R&D and Advertising Capital



































Source: Grabowski and Mueller (1978)
in rates of return for intangible-intensive industries. If we regress the return diﬀerential
on the proportion of capital accounted for by R&D and advertising capital, we ﬁnd the
slope is 0.097 with a standard error of 0.017. (The regression line is plotted in Figure A.1
along with the industry averages.) Drug companies, for example, have an accounting rate
of return of 14.1 percent and an adjusted rate of return of 10.8 percent. Grabowski and
Mueller (1978) ﬁnd that the overall sample variance for the adjusted rate of return is 54
percent of the variance of the unadjusted rate of return.
To test the hypothesis that the remaining variation in returns is due to diﬀerences in
market power, Grabowski and Mueller (1978) regress the adjusted rates of return on a four-
ﬁrm concentration ratio, which is used to proxy for market power. They ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant but negative coeﬃcient on the concentration ratio, implying a rejection of the
hypothesis that the remaining diﬀerences are attributable to market power. They also
3test the impact of risk on ﬁrm proﬁtability using a measure of beta from the capital asset
pricing model. This risk measure was found to be insigniﬁcant in the regressions that they
ran.
Our theory suggests that there are several alternative explanations for the remaining
rate of return diﬀerences. First, R&D and advertising are not the only intangible expendi-
tures. Corporations have ﬁrm-speciﬁc organization capital that is also expensed. Second,
multinational corporations require a more complicated rate of return adjustment, since
part of their intangible capital—namely technology capital—is used in multiple locations.
Third, corporations that are young or multinationals with young aﬃliates have lower rates
of return. This fact necessitates conditioning on the age of the ﬁrms.
We turn next to speciﬁc evidence on rates of return of foreign aﬃliates of U.S. corpo-
rations. The evidence sheds some light on the role of parents’ intangible capital and age
for their proﬁtability.
A.2. Rates of Return of Foreign Aﬃliates Increase with R&D of
Parents
Our theory says that accounting rates of return of foreign aﬃliates should increase with
expensed investments made by their parents. From the BEA annual survey of U.S. direct
investment abroad (USDIA), we have data to construct rates of return for foreign aﬃliates
of U.S. multinationals and data on R&D expenditures of their parents. We ﬁnd that there
is a strong positive relationship.
In Figure A.2, we plot the rates of return of aﬃliates versus the ratio of R&D expen-
ditures to value added of parents. The measured rate of return used for foreign aﬃliates
is the ratio of net income to total assets. For each major industry (using NAIC classiﬁ-
cation), we average the rates of return over the period 1999 to 2005. The ﬁgure includes
4Figure A.2. Rates of Return of Majority-Owned Affiliates
of U.S. Nonbank Parents by R&D Intensity of Parents
Averages, 1999–2005


































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov
statistics for the 22 major industries that had at least 5 years of data needed to construct
the aﬃliate rates of return, at least 5 years of data needed to construct the ratio of parents’
R&D to value added, and average ratios of R&D to value added that exceeded 1 percent.3
If we regress aﬃliate rates of return for the 22 industries shown in Figure A.2, then
we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship with a slope of 0.114 and a standard
error of 0.046. If we include all industries, even those in which the parents have low R&D
intensities, the number of industries is 34 and the coeﬃcient on the R&D intensity is 0.142
with a standard error of 0.079. If we drop three outliers—oil and gas extraction, beverages
and tobacco products, and motion picture and sound recording industries—from the full
3 In some cases, data are suppressed for conﬁdentiality reasons. Industries with very low R&D inten-
sities are not shown so that the graph is readable. Later, we describe how the results change if all
industries are included.
5sample, then the coeﬃcient rises to 0.193 with a standard error of 0.069.4 If we restrict
ourselves to industries with complete data for the period 1999–2005 and any level of R&D
for the parents, we ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of 0.145 and a standard error of 0.055.
The results are also robust to the set of aﬃliates and the industry categorization. The
aﬃliates’ rates of return shown in Figure A.2 are based on data of majority-owned aﬃliates
that are categorized according to their own industry. Results are not signiﬁcantly altered
if we use all aﬃliates or categorize aﬃliates by their parents’ primary industry.
In summary, we ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between aﬃliates’ rates of return
and parents’ R&D expenditures.
A.3. Rates of Return of Foreign Aﬃliates Increase with Age
Our theory says that accounting rates of return of foreign aﬃliates should increase with the
age of the aﬃliate, starting out below rates of return for the parents and eventually rising
to levels above the rates of return for the parents. In this section, we discuss studies done
by the BEA and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on rates of return of foreign aﬃliates
of multinational companies in diﬀerent age categories.5 These studies show that rates of
return generally increase with an aﬃliate’s age. When compared to rates of return for
parents, we ﬁnd that aﬃliates’ rates of return start lower and rise above the rates of their
parents. On average, we ﬁnd that aﬃliates appear more proﬁtable than their parents. This
is what we would expect if parents expense most of the investment in technology capital.
A.3.1. BEA Studies of Multinational Companies
4 One motivation for dropping these outliers is that they are themselves intangible-intensive industries.
Oil and gas industries have large drilling expenses, and the others have large advertising expenses.
5 The BEA’s deﬁnition of age is the number of years the U.S. parent has owned the aﬃliate, and the
IRS’s deﬁnition of age is the number of years since the aﬃliate’s incorporation.
6The BEA conducts surveys of U.S. multinational companies and their aﬃliates and U.S. af-
ﬁliates of foreign multinationals. Three sets of data are collected: (1) balance of payments
and direct investment position data, (2) ﬁnancial and operating data, and (3) establish-
ment and acquisition data. In addition to using the data for compiling the international
accounts, the BEA and researchers using the BEA data frequently conduct studies to assess
the impact of multinational activity on the U.S. and foreign economies. In this section,
we focus on two such studies that consider the relationship of rates of return and age of
aﬃliates.
A.3.1.1. USDIA Survey
In the August 1978 issue of the Survey of Current Business, Lupo, Gilbert, and Liliestedt
report ﬁndings of their investigation of the relationship between age and rate of return of
4,507 foreign manufacturing aﬃliates of U.S. manufacturing parent companies. They sum-
marized their ﬁndings as follows: “Information from the BEA 1966 benchmark survey of
U.S. direct investment abroad shows that the rate of return of foreign aﬃliates of U.S. par-
ent companies increases with age” (p. 60). In this section, we describe the information
available to the BEA from their benchmark survey, the econometric tests run by the three
authors of the study, their main ﬁndings, and some robustness tests that they conducted.
BEA benchmark surveys of U.S. direct investment abroad (USDIA) provide income
statement data and balance sheet data for foreign aﬃliates of U.S. corporations and
U.S. parents as they are recorded on their books. To construct rates of return, Lupo
et al. (1978) divide before-tax net income by total assets net of depreciation.
For the 1966 survey, ten age categories are available for U.S. aﬃliates. Age is deﬁned
as the number of years that the U.S. parent has owned the aﬃliate. For their study, Lupo
et al. condensed these age categories into four: under 4 years, 4 to 6 years, 7 to 9 years,
and 10 years and older. They also split the sample by industry and area to make sure
7Figure A.3. Rates of Return of Foreign Manufacturing
Affiliates of U.S. Manufacturing Parents,


















Source: Lupo, Gilbert, and Liliestedt (1978)
that the relationship was, in their words, “genuine” and not a result of where or what the
aﬃliates were producing.
Figure A.3 shows the rates of return for the total sample by age. The range of returns
is 2.3 percent for aﬃliates less than 4 years old and 11.6 percent for those at least 10 years
old. Figures A.4 and A.5 show the decomposition by industry and by area, respectively.
With a few exceptions, the rates of return are monotonically increasing with age.
Lupo et al. (1978) note that the lack of variation in the transportation equipment is due
to a relatively young European aﬃliate owning several old aﬃliates. They attribute the
nonmonotonicity in metals to some age groups in this industry having only a few aﬃliates
8that dominate the calculations. They attribute the high returns of young Canadian aﬃl-
iates to the operations of automotive aﬃliates, which were closely integrated with their
U.S. parents.
Lupo et al. (1978) check the robustness of their results in several ways. First, they
recalculated returns with after-tax net income rather than before-tax net income. The
main conclusions are not altered. For example, they ﬁnd that the rate of return increases
from 0.1 percent for aﬃliates less than 4 years old to 6.6 percent for aﬃliates at least 10
years old.
A second check shows that the relationship between age and aﬃliate’s rate of return is
not due to secular inﬂation. It is possible that inﬂation could bias Lupo et al.’s results given
that values on the accounts are book values. Older assets are understated if secular inﬂation
is high. This understatement implies that older aﬃliates would have higher returns than
younger aﬃliates simply because inﬂation is positive (and not necessarily because of large
expensed investments incurred with setting up new operations).
















where NIBT is net income before tax, A is assets, IBDT is income before depreciation
and tax, S is sales, and CA is current assets. The second and fourth terms in (A.3.1)
are sensitive to inﬂation because asset values are the book values and depreciation values
depend on when the assets were acquired. The ﬁrst and third terms are not sensitive.
Consider the rates of return in Figure A.3, which rise from 2.3 percent for the younger
aﬃliates to 11.6 percent for the older aﬃliates. The product of the inﬂation-insensitive
components (NIBT/IBDT × CA/A) rises from 10.7 to 30.6, which is roughly a factor
of 3. The product of the inﬂation-sensitive components (IBDT/CA) rises from 21.7 to
37.8, which is a factor of 1.7. This tells us that factors other than inﬂation are driving the
9Figure A.4. Rates of Return of Foreign Manufacturing
Affiliates of U.S. Manufacturing Parents,



























Figure A.5. Rates of Return of Foreign Manufacturing
Affiliates of U.S. Manufacturing Parents,


























Source: Lupo, Gilbert, and Liliestedt (1978)
10main results. Furthermore, most of the variation in the inﬂation-sensitive factors is due to
a low value of net income NIBT for young European aﬃliates. Lupo et al. (1978) view
their income ﬁgure as an aberration and their estimate of the contribution of inﬂation to
the positive relationship between age and rate of return as an upper bound. Thus, they
conclude that rising inﬂation is not a key factor behind the relationship between age and
rate of return of foreign aﬃliates.
In one ﬁnal check of their results, Lupo et al. (1978) considered aﬃliates’ size and age
separately to see if age eﬀect was merely an artifact of size. They ﬁnd that age and size
are correlated, and conditioning on size, still ﬁnd a positive relationship between age and
rates of return of foreign aﬃliates. In our theory, size and age would be correlated, since
new aﬃliates are building up both their tangible capital and their intangible capital as
foreign countries open up.
A.3.1.2. FDIUS Survey
In the March 2000 issue of the Survey of Current Business, Mataloni reports on the rela-
tionship between the return on assets gap and the newness of foreign ownership for 7,906
foreign-owned nonﬁnancial companies operating in the United States in 1989 and 10,223
foreign-owned nonﬁnancial companies operating in the United States in 1996.6 The return
on assets (ROA) is the rate of return measure used in the study and is deﬁned to be the
ratio of proﬁts from current production plus interest to the end-of-year total assets. The
ROA gap is deﬁned to be the return on assets for a foreign-owned company less the return
on assets for all U.S.-owned companies in the same industry. The newness measure he uses
is the new-asset ratio, which is deﬁned to be the ratio of the assets acquired or established
in the preceding two years to the current-year assets.
In Table A.1, we reproduce the results of Mataloni (2000). The table shows that
6 See also some related studies cited in Mataloni (2000).
11Table A.1. Differences in Rates of Return of Foreign-Owned U.S.
Nonfinancial Companies and All U.S.-Owned Nonfinancial Companies,
by New-Asset Ratio
Low new- High new-
Year asset ratio asset ratio
1989 -1.7 -3.0
1996 -2.3 -3.2
Note: A new asset ratio less than 25 percent is categorized as “low” and above that as “high.”
companies in 1989 with a high new-asset ratio had a rate of return gap that is almost
twice as large as the companies with a low ratio, −3.0 versus −1.7. The diﬀerence is not
as large in 1996, but in both years the diﬀerences in the gaps were found to be statistically
signiﬁcant.
A.3.2. IRS Studies of U.S. Multinationals
The IRS biannually publishes statistics for foreign aﬃliates called controlled foreign corpo-
rations whose voting stock is more than 50 percent owned by a U.S. corporation (or other
person). Until very recently, the statistics were reported only for large U.S. corporations
with total assets over a certain size. For the 1982 and 1988 tax returns, the IRS published
further detailed statistics for foreign aﬃliates by year of incorporation.7 In this section,
we report on some of these statistics and show that they conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the BEA
studies.
A.3.2.1. 1982 Tax Returns
Table A.2 summarizes statistics from 1982 tax returns for three categories of corporations:
7 For complete details, see Simenauer (1986) and Latzy and Miller (1992).
12Table A.2. Rates of Return of Large U.S. Multinationals and their Affiliates
Aﬃliates of Large U.S. Corporations
Statistics from Large U.S. Incorporated
1982 Tax Returnsa Corporations Total in 1982
Rate of Return by Industry of:b Parent Parent Aﬃliate Aﬃliate
All industries 2.0 6.6 6.6 1.5
Mining 2.7 11.0 18.1 -4.2
Construction3 3.8 16.1 10.8 NA
Manufacturing 3.7 7.6 8.6 2.9
Transportation & public utilities 2.3 6.6 2.6 2.1
Wholesale and retail trade 2.5 5.8 4.6 0.9
Finance, insurance & real estate 0.2 2.4 3.5 1.7
Services 3.7 6.6 9.6 0.7
Number of Corporations 1,034 26,993 950
Total Assets $4,198,723 $557,207 $12,417
Note: Statistics are derived from tax returns of U.S. corporations with total assets of $250 million or more,
accounting periods ended July 1982 through June 1983, and attached Form(s) 2952 (Information Return
with Respect to Controlled Foreign Corporations) or Form(s) 5471 (Information Return with Respect to
a Foreign Corporation). Data reported are for the entire universe of corporations in this group, so there
is no sampling variability.
a The aﬃliate rate of return is deﬁned as the ratio of earnings and proﬁts before taxes to total assets.
The U.S. parent rate of return is deﬁned as the ratio of net income before tax to total assets. Columns
marked “Parent” report statistics using the industry of the U.S. parent. Columns marked “Aﬃliate” report
statistics using the industry of the foreign aﬃliates.
b NA = not available; earnings for this category were reported as less than $500,000.
(1) large U.S. parents—where “large” refers to corporations with $250 million or more
in assets, (2) foreign aﬃliates of large U.S. parents, and (3) recently incorporated foreign
aﬃliates of large U.S. parents. We report on rates of return by industry, total number of
corporations, and total assets for each group. Rates of return are computed in the same
way by the IRS as by the BEA. The rate of return for aﬃliates is deﬁned as the ratio of
earnings and proﬁts before taxes to total assets. The rate of return for parents is deﬁned as
the ratio of net income before taxes to total assets. Since the primary activity of aﬃliates
and parents may diﬀer, we report rates of return by industry of the U.S. parent and by
industry of the foreign aﬃliate.
13Two important patterns emerge from these statistics. First, we ﬁnd that aﬃliates
are more proﬁtable than their parents on average. This ﬁnding is consistent with our
theory that assumes parents expense technology capital at home and aﬃliates use it in
production abroad. Second, we ﬁnd that recently incorporated aﬃliates are less proﬁtable
than their parents and less proﬁtable than aﬃliates incorporated in the past. This ﬁnding is
consistent with our theory that assumes aﬃliates make large initial plant-speciﬁc intangible
investments abroad. These patterns hold for all major industries. Furthermore, the fact
that returns are higher for older aﬃliates supports the BEA studies of Lupo et al. (1978)
and Mataloni (2000) showing a positive relationship between rates of return and age.
A.3.2.2. 1988 Tax Returns
In 1988, the IRS provided more details by date of incorporation for the largest 7,500 foreign
aﬃliates of large corporations. Corporations were categorized as large in 1988 if they had
total assets of $500 million or more.
In Figure A.6, we graph rates of return for aﬃliates in all industries and in manufac-
turing as a function of their year of incorporation. The rates or return are deﬁned to be
the ratio of current earnings and proﬁts (less deﬁcit) before taxes to total assets. To make
the graph similar to that in Lupo et al. (1978), we aggregate corporations incorporated
before 1980 and show these results along with results for three early age categories. We
do this because most of the variation in rates of return is observed in the ﬁrst 10 years.
For large foreign aﬃliates in manufacturing, the range of rates of return is a little
over 5 percent to 15 percent. This is a little higher than Lupo et al.’s (1978) estimates,
which were in the range of 2 to 12 percent. The diﬀerence is likely attributable to the fact
that the BEA survey includes large and small aﬃliates whereas the IRS includes only large
aﬃliates.
14Figure A.6. Rates of Return of 7,500 Largest Foreign Affiliates
of U.S. Parents with Total Assets of $500 Million or More,















Source: Latzy and Miller (1992)
Another noteworthy feature of the results in Figure A.6 is the discrepancy in rates of
return between manufacturing and all industries. Manufacturing industries are more R&D
intensive and therefore should have higher accounting rates of return. For the recently
incorporated, the diﬀerence in average rates of return is close to 4 percent. For the older
aﬃliates, incorporated before 1980, the diﬀerence in average rates of return is about 5
percent.
A.3.3. BEA and IRS Statistics, 1982–2006
Thus far, we have considered cross-sectional and time-averaged ﬁrm- and industry-level
evidence on aﬃliates’ rates of return. We showed that rates of return of young aﬃliates
start out below rates of return of their parents and eventually exceed them. Using data in
15Figure A.7. Rates of Return of Foreign Affiliates Less Rates
of Return of U.S. Parents Based on Tax Returns of Large
Multinationals and Surveys of All Multinationals












Source: Statistics of Income bulletins and BEA USDIA surveys
1982, we showed that aﬃliate rates of return were on average higher than those of their
parents. The fact that rates of return eventually rise above that of the parents is consis-
tent with the assumption that technology capital is expensed at home and used abroad,
implying a rate of return diﬀerential due to accounting practices. Here, we investigate
this implication using all available data from BEA USDIA surveys and IRS corporate tax
returns.
In Figure A.7, we plot the rate of return diﬀerential between majority-owned aﬃli-
ates and U.S. parents based on the biannual IRS statistics and the annual BEA USDIA
surveys.8 The main diﬀerence in the two are the coverage: the IRS reports statistics for
8 Prior to 1988, the IRS published separate statistics for large corporations and for large corporations
that ﬁled Forms 2952 or 5471 with information speciﬁc to their controlled foreign corporations.
Therefore, starting in 1988, we used statistics for all large corporations when computing the rate of
return for U.S. parents. In 1986, large corporations that ﬁled 2952 or 5471 had a rate of return of
16large multinationals, and the BEA reports statistics for all multinationals. Despite the
diﬀerence in coverage, both plots in Figure A.7 show that the aﬃliates’ accounting rates of
return exceeded that of the parents in every year of the sample. For large multinationals,
the average return diﬀerential based on tax returns is 3.8 percent. For all multinationals
in the BEA USDIA survey, the average return diﬀerential is 2.1 percent.
To summarize, we have shown that there is an abundance of ﬁrm-level and industry-
level evidence supporting three key implications of our theory involving accounting rates
of return: rates of return increase with intangible expenditures, aﬃliates’ rates of return
increase with the parents’ R&D intensity, and aﬃliates’ rates of return increase as they
age.
1.7 percent, all large ﬁrms had a rate of return of 1.77 percent, and aﬃliates of large corporations
had a rate of return of 7.64 percent.
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18Appendix B.
Computation, BEA Accounts, and Sensitivity
B.1. Introduction
In this appendix, we provide details for computing equilibrium paths of our model economy
and constructing model accounts comparable to the national and international accounts
of the BEA We also conduct sensitivity analysis with the model. We demonstrate that
the main ﬁnding of our paper—namely, that the mismeasurement of capital accounts
for roughly 60 percent of the gap in foreign direct investment (FDI) returns—is robust
to alternative choices of income shares, depreciation rates, and tax rates, assuming the
same procedure is followed in setting exogenous parameters governing the model’s current
account.
B.2. Computation of Equilibrium Paths
We let i index countries and j index multinational companies. Assume that j ∈ Ji are








































9 Without loss of generality, we will work with a representative multinational where the index j denotes















































































where F and G are the same for all i and j.
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Households choose sequences of consumption Cit, labor Lit, shares in companies from j
S
j










































t + rbtBit + κit

,
where ¯ Lnb,it is exogenously determined labor in the nonbusiness sector, τci, τli, and τdt are
tax rates on consumption, labor, and company distributions, V
j
t is the price of a share in j,
Wit is the wage rate in country i, and rbt is the after-tax return on lending/borrowing. We
assume that country i has a population of size Nit = nit(1 + γN)t, with common growth
rate γN and a country-speciﬁc shifter nit. Note that the measure of a country’s production
locations is proportional to its population. Hence, we use the same notation for both
variables and set the constant of proportionality equal to one (without loss of generality).
We have included nonbusiness hours (exogenously) in total hours and will include
nonbusiness income less investment in κi. The nonbusiness sector is added in order to
ensure that the national income and product accounts (NIPA) aggregates are of the right
order of magnitude. Because our focus is on returns to capital, we also assume that taxes
on consumption and labor are constant over time while technology parameters and tax
rates on dividends and proﬁts vary over time.
21If U(c,l) = logc + ψ log(1 − l), then the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to Ci, Li,
Bi, and Si for the household in country i are
λ(1 + τci)pt = βtUc,it = βtNit/Cit























where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household budget constraint.
B.2.3. Resource Constraint






























Here, we have explicitly included (exogenous) nonbusiness investment ¯ Xnb,i and output
¯ Ynb,i.
B.2.4. Detrended First-Order Conditions
We will use small letters for growth-detrended variables. Speciﬁcally, let
cit =
Cit
Nit (1 + γy)
t =
Cit























































































where γY is the growth rate of output, γy is the growth rate of per capita output, and γA
is the growth rate of TFP. Using the production technology, we can determine the growth
rate of total output on the balanced growth trend:
(1 + γY) = (1 + γA)(1 + γN)
φ (1 + γY)
φ (1 + γY)
αT(1−φ)
  (1 + γY)
αI(1−φ) (1 + γN)
(1−αT−αI)(1−φ)
= (1 + γA)
1
(1−αT −αI)(1−φ) (1 + γN)
1−(αT +αI)(1−φ)
(1−αT −αI)(1−φ) ,
where recall that γN is the growth rate of the population (and locations).
B.2.5. Equilibrium Paths
Substituting detrended variables into ﬁrst-order conditions implies





















































































































pt/pt+1 = (1 + γy)ci,t+1/(βcit)
pt/pt+1 = 1 + rb,t+1
(1 − τli)wit = ψ (1 + τci)cit/(1 − lit − lnb,it)


































i = 1 and
 
i Bi = 0.
In the case of two countries, computing equilibrium paths involves solving a ﬁxed
point problem of size T ×11, where T is the length of the time series and 11 is the number




t, for all i and j, and one asset
holding. Because asset returns are equated deterministically, we preset bit and S
j
it for one
j and i and include S
−j
−it in the list of unknowns, where superscript −j means “not j” and
subscript −i means “not i.” The fact that bond holdings sum to zero and share holdings
sum to 1 implies all other asset holdings.
Given values for consumption, labor, tangible capital, technology capital, and asset
holdings, we use a subset of ﬁrst-order conditions to infer all remaining variables, and
then we check that the remaining 11 ﬁrst-order conditions hold—namely, the two budget
24constraints of the households, the two labor market clearing conditions, four Euler equa-
tions for tangible capital stocks, two Euler equations for technology capital stocks, and
one Euler equation for foreign bonds. It turns out that the plant-speciﬁc intangible stocks
are proportional to tangible stocks.
We choose initial capital stocks to ensure that investments do not jump at the start
of our sample. Speciﬁcally, we add constraints that the growth in detrended investment
between the ﬁrst and second period is equal to the growth in detrended investment between
the second and third period. We also set initial U.S. GDP to 1 and initial rest of world
GDP to 2.2, which determines the scale for initial U.S. total factor productivity (TFP)
and a scale for the ratio of intangible to tangible capital.
B.2.6. Steady State
We do not linearize around a steady state when computing equilibria, but the steady state
is useful for gaining intuition about our solutions.
The steady state in this economy can be computed as follows. Given parameters,
guess ci, li, and mj and compute
rb = (1 + γy)/β − 1



































































































− (γY + δI)k
j
I,i − (γY + δM)χ
j
imj/ni) + ¯ ynb,i − ¯ xnb,i.












idj/ni − κi, all i















If it does not, we update the guess and continue.





























B.2.7. International Equity Values
Assuming the total shares of multinational j are normalized to 1, the market value of j is
V
j
t . We next guess and verify that
V
j




















Using this guess, we have
V
j
t+1 + (1 − τd,t+1)D
j
t+1

























































































































which veriﬁes the guess because it is consistent with the household’s ﬁrst-order condition
derived above.
B.3. BEA Accounts
Before comparing the model accounts to the BEA accounts for the United States, we make
three adjustments to U.S. GNP and its components. First, we subtract consumption taxes
from NIPA Table 3.5. Second, we subtract personal business expenses for handling life
insurance and pension funds (found in NIPA Table 2.5.5) and treat them as intermediate
ﬁnancial services. Third, we add consumer durable depreciation (in Flow of Funds Table
F10) and capital services for consumer durables and government capital services. The
27capital stocks for consumer durables and government capital are found in the BEA’s Fixed
Asset Table 1.1.10
We now apply the BEA’s procedure to set up the national and international accounts






















































































T,it) − Cit + ¯ Ynb,it − ¯ Xnb,it
• GNPit = GDPit + Net factor receipts less payments

























Portfolio interest: rbtBit if Bit ≥ 0
Net factor payments (to l  = i)
























10 See more details in the Matlab code accounts.m. This program loads in BEA and Flow of Funds
original data ﬁles and writes out Table 4 of the main paper.
28Portfolio interest: rbtBit if Bit ≤ 0
• Balance of Payments: Current account = Financial account
Current account
Net exports




































Portfolio debt: Bi,t+1 − Bit
It is useful to examine the current account and ﬁnancial account for a two-country
case, since we can relate it to the household budget constraints. Let u be the United States
and r be the rest of world. We will index companies in the United States by d, which we
will refer to as “Dell” (or alternatively “Domestic”). We will index rest-of-world companies
by f, which we will refer to as “Fujitsu” (or alternatively “Foreign”). We will assume full
expensing at home.
In this case, the current account can be written as net exports (NX) plus net factor
receipts (NFR) less net factor payments (NFP):











































































+ τp,ut (Yut − WutLut − δTKT,ut − XI,ut) + ¯ Ynb,ut − ¯ Xnb,ut,




T,it the total tangible capital stock in




I,it is total plant-speciﬁc investment in country i. In writing
net factor payments, we assume that But < 0 and therefore net factor interest is paid by
the United States to rest of world.
























































it = 1 for all t. By the balance of payments, FA less CA
is equal to zero and therefore













+ Bu,t+1 − But







t + rbtBut + κut,
which in turn implies that the household period t budget holds each period.
Net foreign asset positions in the BEA’s international accounts are based on the ﬂows
from the ﬁnancial account, with adjustments made for capital gains. Unfortunately, be-
cause of several unavoidable measurement problems, the foreign net asset position concept
is ﬂawed. First, in a world with intangible capital that is expensed, part of the FA earnings
30are not counted. Even if they could be estimated, the part of intangible capital that is tech-
nology capital is neither domestic nor foreign. Finally, without decent transaction prices
for capital stock abroad, an inevitable mismatch occurs when we add portfolio incomes
and direct investment retained earnings.
We asked ourselves, is there a natural alternative to the BEA’s net foreign asset
position measure? Unfortunately, the answer is no for our economy.
B.4. Sensitivity of Main Results
In this section we perform sensitivity analyses. Speciﬁcally, we rerun the exercise described
in the main paper for alternative parameterizations of the model economy, varying param-
eters for which we have little independent information. For convenience, we report the
benchmark constants in Table B.1 of this appendix. In Table B.2 we report the bench-
mark time-varying inputs.
The experiments are conducted as follows. For each alternative set of model constants,
we choose the path for the openness parameters and the relative size so as to mimic trends
in the U.S. current account.11 We set the initial capital stocks so that initial U.S. GDP
is 31 percent of initial world GDP and so that there are no jumps in initial investments.
The initial U.S. TFP is set so that initial U.S. GDP is normalized to 1.
We also investigate the impact of the openness parameters and the (residual) choice
of the weight on foreign stocks in U.S. portfolios. The benchmark inputs are shown in
Table B.2. In the ﬁrst experiment, we ﬁx the openness parameters at the benchmark 1960
level throughout the sample. In the second experiment, we ﬁx the U.S. share of foreign
equities. In both experiments, we adjust the relative size of the rest of world to the United
11 We also set portfolio weights so that the model generates the right split of debt and equity net factor
incomes. Later, we show that the impact of this choice is negligible for our main ﬁndings.
31States to ﬁt the trend in U.S. net exports relative to GNP. As in the benchmark economy,
this is done by adjusting the relative TFPs.
Our results are reported in Tables B.3 and B.4. Table B.3 reports the model’s predic-
tions for average investment shares and capital to output ratios for the period 1960–2006
and business valuations for U.S. companies relative to GNP in the 1960s. These estimates
were used when choosing the benchmark parameters. In Table B.4 we report the predicted
returns on foreign direct investment for U.S. companies and rest of world companies. The
prediction for these returns is the central ﬁnding of the paper. For comparison, we include
predictions of the benchmark model in both tables and returns based on BEA data in
Table B.4. All returns are constructed using the same procedure as the BEA for their
current-cost measures.
The sensitivity analysis summarized in Tables B.3 and B.4 highlights the role that
rents from technology capital and plant-speciﬁc intangible capital play in raising mea-
sured FDI returns and the role that investment in plant-speciﬁc capital plays in lowering
measured foreign returns. As we discussed in the main text, the return on foreign direct
investment in country i made by companies from j, r
j
FD I,it relative to the true return rt to
capital (of all types) is given by
r
j















The ﬁrst term is the excess return due to proﬁts on technology capital and plant-speciﬁc
capital. The second term is the discount in return due to expensed investment in plant-
speciﬁc intangible capital.
In our sensitivity analysis, as we vary the depreciation rate of technology capital δM
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes in predicted investments, stocks, and valuations, but negligible
changes in the returns to FDI. The results of these experiments are shown in rows 1
and 2 of Tables B.3 and B.4. Returns are little changed because the technology capital
32depreciation rate has a negligible impact on the tangible capital to output ratio and a
negligible impact on the share of plant-speciﬁc investment. The choice of δM equal to 8
percent implies a technology capital to GNP ratio in the range of 5 to 6 percent and a
U.S. business value to GNP ratio between 1.5 and 1.6 in the 1960s. These were the targets
used when parameterizing the benchmark model.
When we vary intangible income shares and the depreciation rate of plant-speciﬁc
intangible capital, we ﬁnd a nonnegligible eﬀect on FDI returns. Consider ﬁrst the income
share on technology capital φ. The benchmark value is 7 percent. We experimented with
φ = 8 percent and φ = 6 percent and, as before, changed the exogenous inputs to ensure
that the model generates the same trends in current account ﬂows. The results show that
these alternate speciﬁcations have a nonnegligible eﬀect on both the macro quantities in
Table B.3 and on FDI returns in Table B.4.
Interestingly, in Table B.3, we see that the investment share for plant-speciﬁc capital
rises with φ while the ratio of plant-speciﬁc capital to output falls. This ﬁnding is due to
the fact that the initial capital stocks are also changed in each experiment to ensure that
the auxiliary constraints on initial investments and initial GDPs hold for each experiment.
The magnitude of the capital stocks in turn aﬀects the business valuations. A value of
φ =7 percent implies that the model’s prediction for the 1960s U.S. business value to GNP
is in the range of 1.5 to 1.6.
In rows 3 and 4 of Table B.4, we report the predicted returns on FDI. As is evident
from (B.4.1), there is a direct eﬀect of changing φ through the ﬁrst term and indirect
eﬀects through changes in investment shares and capital to output ratios. With φ = 8
percent, we ﬁnd an increase in both the return on U.S. direct investment abroad and the
return on FDI in the United States. The former increases by 60 basis points and the latter
by 66 basis points. Thus, there is a slight narrowing of the return gap. With φ = 6 percent,
the opposite occurs: both the return on U.S. direct investment abroad and the return on
33direct investment in the United States are lower. The impact is nonlinear, however, since
the gap widens by more than 6 basis points. In fact, with φ = 6 percent, the return gap is
426 basis points, which is close to 70 percent of the actual gap.
Like φ, the income share αI has a direct eﬀect on the excess return in (B.4.1). However,
technology capital and plant-speciﬁc intangible capital aﬀect the FDI return diﬀerently
because one is expensed at home and the other abroad. In the case of foreign plant-
speciﬁc intangible capital, what matters is the timing of expensing, since it directly lowers
the return in (B.4.1). Therefore, what matters is not the choice of the income share αI
alone or the the choice of the depreciation rate δI alone, but rather the pair.
In rows 5 and 6 of Tables B.3 and B.4, we show the results as we vary δI and αI.
We ﬁrst increased δI from 0 in the benchmark to 6 percent, which is equal to the rate
used for tangible capital. This change has the eﬀect of cutting the average plant-speciﬁc
intangible capital to output ratio in half, from 1.2 times GNP to 0.6 times GNP, and the
average ratio of plant-speciﬁc intangible capital to tangible capital by even more, from
0.91 to 0.39. The lower intangible capital stock implies a lower 1960s business value to
GNP ratio, although the impact is partially oﬀset by the fact that companies substitute
across types of capital. The eﬀect on FDI returns shows up in a higher predicted return
on FDI in the United States. Less expensed investment implies a smaller negative term in
(B.4.1). The predicted return for FDI in the United States, then, is 4.3 percent, which is
higher than the roughly 3.1 percent return in the benchmark economy and the U.S. data.
Interestingly, even with a ratio of plant-speciﬁc intangible capital to tangible capital of less
than 40 percent, the return gap is still 270 basis points.
We ﬁnd a much wider FDI return gap when we increase αI from 7 percent in the
benchmark economy to 10 percent. In this case, expensing of plant-speciﬁc intangible
capital plays a much bigger role and the predicted return on FDI in the United States is
34only 2.54 percent, which is lower than the roughly 3.1 percent return in the benchmark
economy and the U.S. data.
In rows 7 and 8 of Tables B.3 and B.4, we show that varying tax rates on consumption
and labor have almost no eﬀect on investments and returns.
In the last three rows of Tables B.3 and B.4, we report results for alternative speci-
ﬁcations of time-varying inputs. Row 9 has results for an alternative projection of rest of
world population. The benchmark economy (in Table B.2) has the ratio of relative pop-
ulations falling after 2010 at the same rate as the most recent decade. In the alternative
speciﬁcation, we assume the ratio of populations does not fall further after 2010. The
results show that the predictions in this case are very close to the benchmark. The FDI
return gap increases, but only slightly.
In row 10 are results for a constant U.S. share of foreign equity, S
f
ut, equal to the
initial level of 1 percent. Recall that in the benchmark economy, we needed to assume
a large shift in shares in 2000 to get the timing in the diﬀerence between receipts and
payments of equity portfolio income to match the U.S. time series. This seems implausible
and is likely due to our strong assumption that there are no diﬀerences in returns due to
risk. In Tables B.3 and B.4, we show that the choice of path for S
f
ut does not aﬀect our
main ﬁndings. For the case of a constant share, the average return gap is diﬀerent from
the benchmark economy by only 4 basis points.
In the ﬁnal experiment, we investigate the model’s predictions if the U.S. and rest
of world economies had not opened up further relative to where they were in 1960. This
is clearly counterfactual given the large rise in FDI incomes, but we are interested in
investigating the impact of our choice of openness parameters. In this experiment, we only
adjust the relative TFPs to ensure that the trend in net exports to GNP is the same in
this case as in the benchmark.
35With no change in openness, both measured returns on FDI are high—roughly 7.9
percent per year—relative to the actual annual return, which is roughly 4.6 percent per
year on all types of capital.12 The gap is approximately zero because foreign companies
do not signiﬁcantly increase their investments in their U.S. subsidiaries with openness
parameters expected to be constant.
12 Since we model trends, we set the period equal to ﬁve years when computing equilibria. In our
experiments, the actual arithmetic return is 4.6 percent per year and the actual geometric return is
4.2 percent per year.






Discount factor β .98
Leisure weight ψ 1.32
Nonbusiness Sector (%)
Fraction of time at work, i = u,r ¯ Lnb,i/Ni 6.0
Nonbusiness investment, i = u,r ¯ Xnb,i/GDPi 15.4
Nonbusiness value added, i = u,r ¯ Ynb,i/GDPi 31.2
Fixed Tax Rates (%)
Tax rates on labor i = u,r τl,i 29.0
Tax rate on consumptions, i = u,r τc,i 7.3
Income Shares (%)
Technology capital φ 7.0
Tangible capital (1 − φ)αT 21.4
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital (1 − φ)αI 6.5
Labor (1 − φ)(1−αT−αI) 65.1
Depreciation Rates (%)
Technology capital δM 8.0
Tangible capital δT 6.0
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital δI 0
37TABLE B.2. Model Time-Varying Inputs
Tax Rates Openness Per U.S.
Relativea Relativea Capita Foreign
Year Populations Dividends Proﬁts ROW U.S. TFPs U.S. Debt Shares
1960 8.20 .400 .408 .8350 .6900 .3730 0 .010
1965 8.42 .400 .403 .8397 .6942 .3727 0 .032
1970 8.64 .400 .396 .8443 .7003 .3725 0 .050
1975 8.86 .397 .386 .8490 .7090 .3722 0 .070
1980 9.08 .370 .375 .8537 .7207 .3719 0 .113
1985 9.30 .246 .361 .8583 .7357 .3714 −.049 .178
1990 9.37 .164 .348 .8630 .7531 .3717 −.098 .220
1995 9.28 .153 .336 .8677 .7718 .3731 −.146 .260
2000 9.16 .152 .327 .8723 .7899 .3743 −.195 .300
2005 9.04 .152 .320 .8770 .8058 .3751 −.244 −.050
2010 8.91 .152 .315 .8817 .8186 .3743 −.270 .000
2015 8.79 .152 .312 .8863 .8283 .3732 −.293 .000
2020 8.67 .152 .310 .8910 .8352 .3723 −.293 .000
2025 8.55 .152 .309 .8957 .8399 .3721 −.293 .000
2030 8.42 .152 .308 .9003 .8431 .3731 −.293 .000
2035 8.30 .152 .307 .9050 .8452 .3745 −.293 .000
a “Relative” implies rest of world relative to the United States.




Intangible Investment Intangible Stocks Intangible Value to































δM = 0% 4.3 3.7 1.39 1.20 0.91 1.82
δM = 16% 5.5 3.9 0.37 1.20 0.91 1.45
φ = 8% 6.1 4.1 0.61 1.17 0.90 1.49
φ = 6% 4.4 2.9 0.47 1.34 0.96 1.61
δI = 6% 5.2 4.2 0.59 0.60 0.39 1.47
αI = 10% 5.6 7.0 0.52 1.54 1.22 1.56
τc = 40% 5.3 3.9 0.53 1.21 0.91 1.51
τl = 40% 5.3 3.9 0.53 1.21 0.91 1.51
nrt
nut = 8.8,t> 2010 5.3 3.6 0.54 1.24 0.92 1.54
S
f
ut constantb 5.3 4.1 0.53 1.16 0.89 1.47
σit constantb 5.3 4.0 0.52 1.19 0.90 1.47
Benchmark 5.3 3.9 0.53 1.20 0.91 1.51
a Parameters and results are in annual units.
b Model FDI incomes are not matched to U.S. FDI incomes.
39TABLE B.4. Alternative Model Predictions for FDI Returns, 1982–2006a
% Return on U.S. % Return on FDI
Model DI Abroad in U.S. Diﬀerence
Alternatives:
δM = 0% 7.03 3.12 3.91
δM = 16% 7.09 3.12 3.97
φ = 8% 7.63 3.78 3.85
φ = 6% 6.59 2.33 4.26
δI = 6% 7.00 4.30 2.70
αI = 10% 7.05 2.54 4.51
τc = 40% 7.07 3.11 3.96
τl = 40% 7.07 3.11 3.96
nrt
nut = 8.8,t> 2010 7.06 3.07 3.99
S
f
ut constantb 7.10 3.15 3.95
σit constantb 7.90 7.93 −.03
Benchmark 7.08 3.12 3.96
U.S. Data 9.40 3.15 6.25
a Parameters and results are in annual units.
b Model FDI incomes are not matched to U.S. FDI incomes.
40Appendix C.
The Impact of Technology Capital on Productivity and
Net Exports
C.1. Introduction
In this appendix, we work with a simple version of the model presented in the main paper
to gain intuition for some of the results. We refer to this simple model as the stripped-
down model because we “strip out” taxation, plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, nonbusiness
activities, and equities from our general model to make our analysis tractable. In the
stripped-down version of the model, the only recorded transactions in the current account
are net shipments of goods and net borrowing or lending.13
We use the stripped-down model to analytically characterize and contrast equilibria in
economies with and without technology capital. We demonstrate that including technology
capital in our stripped-down model—which is an otherwise standard two-country growth
model—has an important impact on its predictions for relative labor productivities and net
exports. In a standard model without technology capital, relative productivities and the
level of borrowing and lending across countries depend only on countries’ relative TFPs.
When we include technology capital, we ﬁnd that relative populations and the degree of
countries’ openness also matter. We demonstrate this in several propositions and then
show equilibrium paths for several empirically motivated numerical examples.
The main lesson that we draw from the results is that the change in the relative
13 There are two Matlab codes that generate equilibrium paths shown in the ﬁgures of this appendix.
The code nx tcap.m generates results for the model with technology capital included, and nx std.m
generates results for the standard model without technology capital.
41populations was an important factor in the recent decline of the trade balance, and this
fact is not captured by standard international models that abstract from technology capital.
C.2. Stripped-Down Model
We start with a stripped-down model. In order to make it easier to follow, we adopt the
following notation: u stands for United States, r stands for rest of world, d stands for Dell
(a U.S. company), and f stands for Fujitsu (a non-U.S. company).
We will consider both a planning problem (with utility weights λ and 1 − λ) and a
decentralized economy with borrowing and lending and some initial outstanding debt. The
allocations for the planner’s problem and the decentralized economy are the same for a
particular λ in the planner’s problem and initial debt in the decentralized problem.








βtλ{log(Cut/Nut) + ψ log(1 − Lut/Nut)}Nut
+ (1 − λ){log(Crt/Nrt) + ψ log(1 − Lrt/Nrt)}Nrt,
subject to the global resource constraint and the capital accumulation equations
Cut + Crt + XK,ut + XK,rt + Xd
M,t + X
f
M,t = Yut + Yrt
Ku,t+1 = (1 − δ)Kut + XK,ut
Kr,t+1 = (1 − δ)Krt + XK,rt
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d












with initial stocks Ki0, i = u,r, and M
j
0, j = d,f given.
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and aggregate output in country i is Yit = Y d
it +Y
f
it, i = u,r. In the standard model, φ = 0










where i = u or r.
The allocations for the planner’s problem are equivalent to those of the following
decentralized economy with borrowing and lending conditional on a particular value for







t {log(Cut/Nut) + ψ log(1 − Lut/Nut)}Nut
subject to the period budget constraints and the capital accumulation equations,
Cut + XK,ut + Xd









Ku,t+1 = (1 − δ)Kut + Xut
Md
t+1 = (1 − δ)Md
t + Xd
M,t,
and initial conditions Ku0, Md




t} given. The rest-of-world households solve a similar
problem, speciﬁed by replacing u with r and d with f.
43If we solve the planner’s problem for a particular value of λ, we can construct the

















u,s−1) − 1, c∗
u is per capita U.S. consumption, and the asterisk denotes
allocations of the planner’s problem. Alternatively, if we solve the decentralized problem




for any period t allocation from the decentralized economy, where cr is per capita rest of
world (ROW) consumption.
C.3. Relative Labor Productivities
In this section, we derive an expression for the relative labor productivities when there is no
uncertainty and countries are not yet fully open.14 Of particular interest is a comparison
of results for cases without technology capital (φ = 0) and cases with technology capital
(φ > 0). The main results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Assume σit ∈ [0,1), i = u,r and parameters are chosen so that companies
in both countries have positive technology capital stocks.15 If φ = 0, then there is no foreign
production, Y
f
ut = Y d
rt = 0 for all t, as long as the openness parameters are strictly less










14 In the case that countries are fully open, the country technology capital stocks are indeterminate.
15 In our companion paper, we consider examples where some countries are on corners and do not
accumulate technology capital.
































































which depends on the relative degrees of openness, the relative TFPs, and the relative
populations. The more closed the country is, the higher is its TFP, and the more populous
it is, the higher is its labor productivity relative to the other country.





µt = (1 − λ)
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for t ≥ 0, where µt is the multiplier on the global resource constraint.
Capital-output ratios are equated within and across countries, and labor productivities
are equated within countries. The capital-output ratios are equal to
κt =
βα(1 − φ)
cut/cu,t−1 − β (1 − δ)
,






















































if both regions are investing a positive amount in technology capital. The ratio (C.3.1)
tells us that the ratio of foreign to domestic production in the United States increases with
the ratio of technology capital stocks and the degree of U.S. openness. Here, we used the






















46Again, it must be the case that Ld
rt/L
f




Next, we use the fact that returns to technology capital are equated across companies,
Y d
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 1−α 1−φ 
. (C.3.4)
Several more substitutions are needed before we can write an expression for the ratio of
foreign to domestic output in each country.
Next, we use (C.3.1) and (C.3.2) and the fact that the ratios of labor inputs have the
same expressions to eliminate Y f
u , Y f
r , Lf
u, and Lf

















































Dividing all terms in (C.3.5) by ((Y d
ut)α(Ld




































A second equation relating these ratios comes from the production technologies in


















 (1−α)(1−φ)  1
1−α(1−φ)
. (C.3.7)
With (C.3.6) and (C.3.7), we now can write simple expressions for the ratios of outputs



























































Finally, we can use the ratios of outputs and hours in (C.3.8) and (C.3.9) to express

































If φ = 0, then σ
1/φ
it = 0, N
φ
it = 1 and the ratio of labor productivities is equal to the ratio
of TFPs raised to the power 1/(1 − α). If φ > 0, then the relative productivities depend
not only on the relative TFPs, but also on the relative degrees of openness and the relative
populations.
Next, we report on the model’s predictions for components of the U.S. net exports.
48C.4. Net Exports
In this section, we investigate the model’s predictions as we change the relative TFPs, the
relative population sizes, and the relative degrees of openness. We ﬁrst consider pertur-
bations around a steady state and derive analytical results, and then we run numerical
simulations and report transition paths. In both, we demonstrate that the experiments
look very diﬀerent for cases with and without technology capital.
C.4.1. Steady State Results
The goal of this section is to derive analytical expressions for changes in U.S. net exports
and net factor incomes relative to U.S. output as we change the rest-of-world TFP, popu-
lation, and degree of openness. The main results are summarized in Proposition 2. After
deriving the results, we consider cases with and without technology capital.
Proposition 2. Changes in the ratio of net exports to output are given by
d(NXu/Yu) = −d(Cu/Yu) − δ d(Md/Yu) (C.4.1)









































































































49All variables and derivatives are evaluated at the steady state, li = Li/Ni, and
∆u = (1 − δκ − δµ)Yr − Cr (C.4.5)
κ = βα(1 − φ)/(1 − β (1 − δ)) (C.4.6)
µ = βφ/(1 − β (1 − δ)). (C.4.7)


























where Mu = Md + σ
1/φ










































Proof. In a steady state, the ratio of net exports to output for country u is given by
NXu
Yu
= (Yu − Xd − Xu − Cu)/Yu
= 1 − δMd/Yu − δκ − Cu/Yu,
where κ = Kij/Yij is equal to (C.4.6) above. Fully diﬀerentiating this ratio, we get
d(NXu/Yu) = −δd(Md/Yu) − d(Cu/Yu). (C.4.10)
Note that the variations we consider do not aﬀect κ.
Since both derivatives in (C.4.10) depend on derivatives of relative productivities, we


























50where it is implicitly assumed that variation is due only to changes in Nr, Ar, or σr. A
second relation involving d(Yr/Lr) and d(Yu/Lu) is derived using the fact that the return
on U.S. technology capital, φ(Y d
u + Y d
r )/Md, does not depend on the magnitudes of Ar,




































































The second equation in (C.4.12) is derived by fully diﬀerentiating the equations in (C.2.1)
and using the fact that labor productivities are equated within countries and capital-output
ratios are equated across countries. The term dMd/Md cancels on both sides of equation
























Solving (C.4.11) and (C.4.13) for d(Lu/Yu) and d(Lr/Yr) yields the expressions (C.4.3)
and (C.4.4) given in the statement of the proposition.
The next step is to use the intratemporal conditions and the global resource con-
straint to jointly determine dLu, dLr, and dCu/Yu. In particular, we fully diﬀerentiate








































51with the derivative of the ratio of productivities given as above. In writing the last equa-
tions, we made two simple substitutions for Cr/Yr and Yr/Yu so as to make the algebra
more manageable.
We spare the reader details of the tedious algebra but describe the exact steps to get
the expression (C.4.2). We ﬁrst replace Cu/Yu in (C.4.16) using (C.4.15), and then we
fully diﬀerentiate (C.4.14) and (C.4.16). Once diﬀerentiated, the two equations can be
simpliﬁed and written as two equations with unknowns dLu and dLr that are written in
terms of dNr, d(Yr/Lr), and d(Yu/Lu). As shown above, derivatives of labor productivities
can be written in terms of changes of exogenous variables. See, in particular, equations
(C.4.3) and (C.4.4). Thus, the changes in hours found by diﬀerentiating (C.4.14) and
(C.4.16) can be written explicitly in terms of changes of exogenous variables, namely dNr,
dAr, and dσr. The ﬁnal step is to diﬀerentiate (C.4.15), thus expressing dCu/Yu in terms
of dLu. Substituting in the expression for dLu, we have (C.4.2).
Next, we need Md/Yu. Since it is easier to work with eﬀective technology capital
stocks, we deﬁne Mu = Md+σ
1/φ
u Mf and Mr = Mf +σ
1/φ
r Md as the eﬀective stocks used
in the United States and the ROW, respectively. Using the production technologies, we
can write total outputs in terms of Mu and Mr as follows:





































































































where Mu = Md + σ
1/φ
u Mf and Mr = Mf + σ
1/φ
r Md.
Equation (C.4.19) requires the derivatives of the technology capital stocks relative to

























which in turn requires knowing d(Yu/Lu), d(Yr/Lr), and d(Yr/Yu). Derivatives for the
labor productivities were derived above and are given in equations (C.4.3) and (C.4.4).
















































































53which yields (C.4.22) as a function of the derivatives of the two consumption shares, Cu/Yu










and using the solution to dLr found above.
The expression for d(Yr/Yu) can be further simpliﬁed by replacing d(Cu/Yu) in (C.4.22)
and (C.4.23) with (C.4.2).
We are now ready to compare changes in the ratio of net exports share in economies
with technology capital to changes in economies without technology capital.
If φ = 0, then productivity in the economy that does not experience any changes in
TFP, population, or openness does not change, that is, d(Yu/Lu) = 0. In ROW, the only









As an example, assume that α = .3. Then, a 1 percent increase in ROW TFP leads to a
1.43 percent increase in ROW productivity. But there are no spillovers to productivity in
country u, the United States.
When φ = 0, a rise in TFP in ROW impacts net exports in the United States only




































where, in this case with φ = 0, ∆u = NXr = −NXu.
54If we choose empirically plausible parameters, the steady state level of ∆u would be
close to zero. With this further simpliﬁcation, the ratio of net exports to output in the
standard model without technology capital is given by
d(NXu/Yu)
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Compare (C.4.25) with the same expression for the case with φ > 0 and ∆u = 0,
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− δ d(Md/Yu). (C.4.26)
We laid out equation (C.4.26) in such a way as to make the comparison with (C.4.25)
simple. These relations share the ﬁrst term, although the impact of TFP is larger when
φ > 0 because 1/(1 − φ) > 1. In the case of φ = 0, there are no additional eﬀects due to
dNr or dσr. As we show next, this abstraction can be quantitatively important.
We now consider a simple numerical exercise to illustrate that adding φ > 0 can
have a quantitatively important impact on the productivities, consumption shares, and
net exports. In Table C.1, we report parameter values that we use in this simple model
for this exercise. These are not the same parameters used in our paper, since the model
of this section is a stripped-down version of the model in the main paper.
We choose β = 0.96, since we abstracted from trend growth. This implies an annual
interest rate of around 4 percent. We choose the leisure weight so that time at work is
55between 25 percent and 30 percent of total time. We set income shares so that the split of
nontechnology capital income is 30/70 for capital and labor. The common depreciation rate
is set at 5 percent. The ratio of ROW population to the U.S. population is 8. Regardless
of φ we set initial debt equal to 0. This implies λ = .79 in both the model with and the
model without technology capital. The relative technology levels are set so that U.S. GDP
is equal to 32 percent of world GDP. Finally, in the case with technology capital, we need
to specify openness parameters. For the steady state calculations we use .75 for both.
Let us start with the model with technology capital and φ > 0. With the parameters
set as in Table C.1, hu and hr are both around 0.287, the consumption ratios are both
around 0.81, and Cr/Cu = 2.13. The parameters also imply that the residual ∆u is
approximately equal to 0.
Using these values in the formulas above, we consider changes in the three exogenous
ROW variables: Ar, Nr, and σr. The U.S. labor productivity does not change with either
Ar or Nr, but ROW labor productivity does. The formulas yield d(Yr/Lr)/(Yr/Lr) =
4.21dAr and d(Yr/Lr)/(Yr/Lr) = .0134dNr. The openness parameter aﬀects both la-
bor productivities, with the largest impact on U.S. productivity: d(Yu/Lu)/(Yu/Lu) =
.0336dσr and d(Yr/Lr)/(Yr/Lr) = −.0006dσr.
In terms of changes in the U.S. consumption share, we ﬁnd d(Cu/Yu)/(Cu/Yu) =
−9.98dAr, d(Cu/Yu)/(Cu/Yu) = .0318dNr, and d(Cu/Yu)/(Cu/Yu) = −.081dσr. These
eﬀects are much larger than those on the technology capital investment: d(δMd/Yu) =
.02dAr, d(δMd/Yu) = −.0002dNr, and d(δMd/Yu) = .013dσr. Thus, most of the change
in the U.S. net exports share comes from the change in the U.S. consumption share term
in (C.4.1).
Adding the derivatives of the consumption share and the investment share together
yields the following results for the net exports share: d(NXu/Yu) = −8.10dAr, d(NXu/Yu)
56= −.026dNr, and d(NXu/Yu) = .053dσr. With Ar = .365, a 1 percent change in the ROW
TFP implies a drop in net exports from 0.13 percent of output to −3 percent of output.
With Nr = 8, a 1 percent increase in the ROW population implies a drop in net exports
from 0.13 percent of output to roughly −.2 percent of output. With a 20 percent increase
in the ROW population, which is more empirically plausible for the post–World War II
period, there is a drop in net exports from 0.13 percent to about −4 percent of output.
With σr = .75, a 1 percent increase in the ROW degree of openness implies an increase in
net exports from 0.13 percent of output to 0.17 percent of output.
Now, suppose that technology capital is not included in the model and φ = 0. With
the parameters set as in Table C.1, hu and hr are both around 0.295, the consumption
ratios are both around 0.836, and Cr/Cu = 2.13. In this case, the parameters again imply
that the residual ∆u is approximately equal to 0. Using the formula in (C.4.25), we get
d(NXu/Yu) = −6.96dAr. In the case with φ = .07, we found d(NXu/Yu) = −8.10dAr,
which implies that technology ampliﬁes the impact of changes in TFP.
C.4.2. Transition Results
In this section, we analyze equilibrium paths for the stripped-down model economy that
we analyzed above.
The main point of this section, as in the earlier section, is to demonstrate that adding
technology capital leads to very diﬀerent predictions. Here, we focus on equilibrium paths.
Since changes in population and TFP have diﬀerent impacts on equilibrium paths, we
consider changing each, one at a time. The time series of these inputs are displayed in
Figures C.1 and C.2.
The experiments use the same constants as in Table C.1 and initial conditions from
Tables C.2 and C.3. In Table C.2, we list the initial capital stocks for experiments with
57ﬁxed degrees of openness. In Table C.3, we list the initial capital stocks for an experiment
with increasing degrees of openness.
If there are no changes in any exogenous parameters, the capital stocks remain at the
levels shown in Tables C.2 and C.3. If households do expect changes in the exogenous
parameters and B0 is set equal to zero, then the equilibrium paths display initial jumps or
declines in investments in anticipation of shifting production. For this reason, we adjusted
the initial debt level in each experiment so that investment would adjust smoothly. These
necessary adjustments are reported in Tables C.2 and C.3. If we instead hold B0 = 0,
the model predicts initial adjustments in investments, but the equilibrium paths that we
display would have exactly the same patterns after year 1.16
Increased ROW Population
We ﬁrst consider the model’s time series predictions when the population of the rest
of world increases relative to that of the United States, as shown in Figure C.1. The main
ﬁndings for this experiment are shown in Figures C.3–C.6.
In Figure C.1, we display the time series of the ROW population Nrt for our ﬁrst
experiment, with Nut set equal to one in all periods. The ROW population starts at 8,
rises almost 20 percent, and then returns. Here, we assume that TFPs are ﬁxed.17
As we discussed in the main paper, the path of the relative size of countries is an
important determinant of the path of net exports. In Figure C.3, we show the actual
U.S. net exports relative to GDP along with model predictions in the case with technology
capital included and in the case without. We plot the U.S. data to show that the model
with technology capital can generate a dramatic drop in net exports relative to GDP, such
16 The computer codes at http://www.minneapolisfed.org oﬀer the user the choice of adjusting or not
adjusting the debt level.
17 We also ran cases for permanent increases after 2003. The results over the period 1960–2000 are so
close that we do not report them here. Interested readers can see results of these experiments at our
website.
58as that experienced recently in the United States. To emphasize the diﬀerence between the
models with and without technology capital, we show both in Figure C.3. If there is no
technology capital, the net exports share remains at about 1 percent until the late 1990s
and then declines to roughly −1 percent of output.
If there is no technology capital, the stripped-down model predicts an increase in
investment abroad, which is becoming more populous, and then a shift back when the
rest-of-world population reverts to its balanced growth path.18 Let A = A1/(1−α). We can
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, if φ = 0. (C.4.27)
The equality in (C.4.27) only holds when φ = 0 and follows from the fact that the param-
eters in Tables C.1 and C.2 imply that the ratio of per capita consumption in the United
States relative to the ROW is equal to Au/Ar.19 Since relative labor productivities are
also equal to this ratio (as seen in (C.3.10)), it follows from the intratemporal conditions
that outputs per eﬀective person, Yit/AiNit, are also equal. Thus, in the case of φ = 0,
18 If B0 is set equal to zero, then there is an initial jump in U.S. net exports and an initial drop in
U.S. investment.
19 The allocations for the decentralized economy with B0 = −.081 are the same as the planner’s problem
with λ = .79. The ratios of per capita consumptions in both cases are equal to 3.76.
59the only borrowing and lending that goes on (assuming no initial jumps) is done so that
capital-output ratios can be equalized.
In Figures C.4–C.6, we show the paths of the consumption shares, labor productivities,
and per capita GDPs for the models with and without technology capital. In all three, the
paths for the two countries lie on top of each other when technology capital is excluded
(φ = 0). When the model includes technology capital (φ > 0), the patterns for the
United States and ROW are completely diﬀerent. There are two reasons for this. The
ﬁrst reason is that GDP does not include all output produced in a country. True output
includes investment in technology capital. Therefore, although capital-output ratios are
equated, both within countries (across domestic and foreign ﬁrms) and across countries,
these relations do not imply that measured capital to GDP ratios are equated.
A second reason for the diﬀerent patterns in equilibrium paths for U.S. and ROW
series is that size has a positive scale eﬀect on GDP per capita and productivity. This
scale eﬀect arises because of the fact that technology capital can be used simultaneously at
multiple locations and the measure of locations is proportional to a country’s population.
As the ROW population increases, its output increases by more than the rise in population.
With greater world production, per capita consumptions rise in both countries, but the
share of consumption in GDP rises in the United States as more production is being done
abroad and falls in the ROW where GDP is rising. This is shown in Figure C.4.
Figure C.5 shows that the ROW labor productivity increases relative to U.S. labor
productivity as Nrt/Nut increases, which is consistent with (C.3.10). Because relative per
capita hours are changing, we also predict deviations in per capita GDPs, with the ROW
increasing relative to the United States.
In Figures C.7–C.8, we show how the prediction for the U.S. trade deﬁcit changes if
we allow for diﬀerent patterns of openness. In Figure C.7, we use the same series as in the
60main paper. Figure C.8 shows the result and compares it to the case with the degrees of
openness ﬁxed. In the case of the trade deﬁcit, the main diﬀerence is that the predicted
decline in the net export share is not as large if we assume that countries are opening to
FDI as the ROW population increases.
Here, we are working with a stripped-down version of our model with technology
capital, but there are some lessons that are common in the two exercises. First, with
an empirically plausible rise in the population of the ROW, the model generates a large
and empirically plausible decline in net exports relative to GDP, which is much larger
than standard theory predicts. Second, the model generates a plausible increase in the
U.S. consumption share of GDP and a plausible decline in the U.S. share of world GDP.
Increased ROW TFP
We turn next to the experiment of increasing ROW size by increasing total factor
productivity. In Figure C.2, we display the time series of the ROW total factor productivity
Art relative to Ar0. We chose an increase of 1.2 percent for ROW TFP in order to generate
an empirically plausible decline in the share of net exports in GDP. As before, we compare
the predictions of the models with and without technology capital. The results are shown
in Figures C.9–C.12.
In Figure C.9, we plot the ratio of U.S. net exports relative to GDP for the stripped-
down model with and without technology. For the sake of comparison, we also plot the
actual U.S. share. Interestingly, the pattern looks very diﬀerent from that of Figure C.3,
which shows the change in U.S. net exports in the case of higher ROW population. The
primary reason for the diﬀerence is that GDP rather than output is in the denominator.
Recall that our formulas above used output rather than GDP, which is equal to output
less investment in technology capital. We did this to make the analytical results more
tractable.
61In Figures C.10–C.12, we show the consumption shares, labor productivities, and per
capita GDP for the models with and without technology capital. As we demonstrated
earlier, changes in the endogenous variables are similar in the two models, except that
there is some ampliﬁcation of the impact in the case of the model with technology capital,
since the term 1/(1 − φ), which multiplies Ar, is greater than 1.
62TABLE C.1. Parameter Values for Steady State Analysis
in the Stripped-Down Model
Parameters Expression Value
Common parameters
Discount factor β .96
Leisure weight in utility ψ 2
Capital share of other income α .3
Depreciation rate δ .05
Relative populations Nr/Nu 8
Initial debt B0 0
With technology capital
Technology capital share φ .07
Relative technology level Ar/Au .365
U.S. openness σu .75
ROW openness σr .75
Without technology capital
Technology capital share φ 0
Relative technology level Ar/Au .396
63TABLE C.2. Initial Conditions for Transition Analysis in the
Stripped-Down Model, Openness Parameters Fixed
Description Expression Value
With technology capital, φ > 0
Tangible capital of Dell in U.S. Kd
u0 1.32
Tangible capital of Fujitsu in U.S. K
f
u0 .047
Tangible capital of Dell in ROW Kd
r0 .022
Tangible capital of Fujitsu in ROW K
f
r0 2.89
Technology capital of Dell Md
0 .337




No changes in exogenous variables B0 0
ROW population as in Figure C.1 B0 .047
ROW TFP as in Figure C.2 B0 .130
Without technology capital, φ = 0
Tangible capital of U.S. Ku0 1.60
Tangible capital of ROW Kr0 3.42
Initial debt
No changes in exogenous variables B0 0
ROW population as in Figure C.1 B0 -.081
ROW TFP as in Figure C.2 B0 .139
64TABLE C.3. Initial Conditions for Transition Analysis in the
Stripped-Down Model, Openness Parameters Varyinga
Description Expression Value
Tangible capital of Dell in U.S. Kd
u0 1.36
Tangible capital of Fujitsu in U.S. K
f
u0 .013
Tangible capital of Dell in ROW Kd
r0 .123
Tangible capital of Fujitsu in ROW K
f
r0 2.79
Technology capital of Dell Md
0 .373
Technology capital of Fujitsu M
f
0 .703
Initial debt B0 .047
a For this experiment, φ = .07, Art = .363 for all t, the path {Nrt} is shown in Figure
C.1, and the paths for {σit}, i = u,r are shown in Figure C.11.










Figure C.1. Temporary Increase in ROW Population





Figure C.2. Temporary Increase in ROW TFP









Model without technology capital
Model with technology capital
Figure C.3. U.S. Net Exports to GDP and Predictions in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW Population












Model without technology capital,
both countries
Model with technology capital, U.S.
Model with technology capital, ROW
Figure C.4. Predictions of Consumption to GDP Ratio in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW Population







Model without technology capital, both countries
Model with technology capital, U.S.
Model with technology capital, ROW
Figure C.5. Predictions of Labor Productivity in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW Population












Model without technology capital, both countries
Model with technology capital, U.S.
Model with technology capital, ROW
Figure C.6. Model Predictions of Per Capita GDP in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW Population
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Degree of openness, U.S.
Figure C.7. Increasing Degrees of Openness















Figure C.8. U.S. Net Exports to GDP and Predictions in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW Population:
A Comparison of Fixed and Increasing Openness













Figure C.9. U.S. Net Exports to GDP and Predictions in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW TFP












Model with technology capital, U.S.
Model without technology capital, U.S.
Model with technology capital, ROW
Model without technology capital, ROW
Figure C.10. Predictions of Consumption to GDP Ratio in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW TFP












Model without technology capital, U.S.
Model with technology capital, U.S.
Figure C.11. Predictions of Labor Productivity in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW TFP












Model with technology capital, ROW
Model without technology capital, ROW
Model without technology capital, U.S.
Model with technology capital, U.S.
Figure C.12. Model Predictions of Per-Capita GDP in the Stripped-
Down Model with a Temporary Increase in ROW TFP
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